UNITED STATES TAX COURT
KEITH LAMAR JONES, Petitioner v
.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 6936-04S. Filed November 29, 2005.
Keith Lamar Jones, pro se.
William J. Gregg
, for respondent.
PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge
: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed. The decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion should not be cited as authority. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Internal Petitioner timely filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2001. Chase Manhattan Bank issued to petitioner a Form 1099-R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., showing a gross and taxable distribution from his 401(k) plan for 2001 of $30,368.86. Petitioner included the $30,368.86 distribution as income on his return but did not report the additional tax for an early distribution under section 72(t). In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner was liable for a 10-percent additional tax on the early 401(k) plan distribution pursuant to section 72(t).
Discussion
Taxpayers generally bear the burden of proving the
Commissioner’s determinations are incorrect. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering , 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The burden as to a factual issue relevant to the liability for tax may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and satisfies the requirement to substantiate items. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(A). The facts are not in dispute in this case, and section 7491(a) has no bearing in this case.
Section 72(t)(1) imposes an additional tax on an early distribution from qualified retirement plans equal to 10 percent under section 7701(a)(37). The qualified retirement plan from which petitioner withdrew the $30,368.86 is a plan described in section 401(k), and therefore the exceptions contained in section 72(t)(2)(E) and (F), regarding higher education expenses and first-time home purchases respectively, do not apply. Petitioner’s 401(k) plan is not an IRA as described by the exceptions in section 72(t)(2)(E) and (F).
Petitioner’s assertion that he was informed that he could have transferred the funds from the 401(k) plan to an IRA, that the funds were left in the 401(k) plan for 2 years without petitioner’s making any contributions, and that the difference between a 401(k) plan and an IRA is a matter of form, does not change the fact that the amount received by petitioner was not a distribution from an IRA.
We recognize that the differences between a qualified retirement plan and an IRA are highly technical. To this extent, we sympathize with petitioner’s confusion. Regarding section 72(t), this Court has repeatedly held that it is bound by the statutory exceptions enumerated in section 72(t)(2). See, e.g., Arnold v. Commissioner , 111 T.C. 250, 255-256 (1998); Schoof v.
Commissioner
, 110 T.C. 1, 11 (1998).
Accordingly, respondent’s determination that petitioner is liable for the 10-percent additional tax is sustained.
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered for respondent .