be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion should not be cited as authority.

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners’ Federal income tax of $5,181 for the taxable year 1998.

The issues for decision are:

(1) Whether petitioners are entitled to deduct Washington State real estate excise taxes of $12,209. We hold that they are not.

(2) Whether petitioners are liable under section 72(t) for the 10-percent additional tax on an early distribution from petitioner Kurt Steven Urban’s (Mr. Urban) individual retirement account (IRA). We hold that they are to the extent provided herein.

An adjustment to the amount of petitioners’ itemized deductions is a purely computational matter, the resolution of which is dependent on our disposition of the first disputed issue.

Background

At the time that the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Portland, Oregon.

A. Real Estate Excise Tax

From 1994 through 1998, petitioners owned and resided in a single-family home located at 5518 174th Place Southeast, Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering , 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Higbee v. Commissioner , 116 T.C. 438 (2001).

A. Real Estate Excise Tax

The first issue is whether petitioners are entitled to deduct under section 164(a)(1) the Washington State real estate excise tax that they paid on the sale of their residence. As relevant herein, section 164(a) allows a deduction for five specific categories of taxes, specifically including State, local, and foreign real property taxes. Sec. 164(a)(1). Notwithstanding the general deductibility of taxes, any tax that does not fall within one of the specific categories of deductible taxes enumerated in section 164(a) and that is paid or accrued in connection with the disposition of property shall be treated as a reduction in the amount realized on the disposition of that property.

Section 1.164-3(b), Income Tax Regs., defines real property taxes as: “taxes imposed on interests in real property and levied for the general public welfare, but it does not include taxes assessed against local benefits.” [Emphasis added.] Petitioners contend that Washington State’s real estate excise tax constitutes a State real property tax for purposes of section 164(a)(1). Petitioners’ theory is that the State of Washington:

does not have a general state income tax and therefore must collect taxes from other sources to run the state, local and community services associated with all citizens in the state of Washington. All people who sell there [sic] homes are uniformly assessed this excise property sales tax. This is in effect a property tax that is collected on the sale of every home in the entire state of Washington and should be able to be deducted the same as any other state who has a State Income Tax that would be recognized as deductible and would be allowed on the Schedule A 1040 form.

In support of their contention, petitioners rely on the Internal Revenue Service’s Form 1040 Instructions for Schedule A, Line 6, Real Estate Taxes, which state in relevant part:

Include taxes (state, local, or foreign) you paid on real estate you own that was not used for business, but only if the taxes are based on the assessed value of the property. Also, the assessment must be made uniformly on property throughout the community, and the proceeds must be used for general community or governmental purposes. * * *”

As a preliminary matter, however, we observe that

Instructions are not authoritative sources of law in the tax field. Casa De La Jolla Park, Inc. v. Commissioner , 94 T.C. 384, 396 (1990). Taxpayers must look to authoritative sources of Federal tax law such as the statutes, regulations, or judicial decisions. Green v. Commissioner , 59 T.C. 456, 458 (1972).

Thus, we begin our analysis by looking to State law to determine whether Washington State’s real estate excise tax satisfies the definition of a real property tax for Federal income tax purposes; i.e., whether it is a tax imposed on an interest in real property. If the Washington State real estate excise tax does not constitute a State real property tax for [Emphasis added.]

See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. ch. 82.45 (West 2000); Wash. Admin. Code sec. 458-61-015, Real Estate Excise Tax (2004).

According to the statute, it is clear that the nature and character of the tax at issue are those of an excise tax. Typically, an excise tax is imposed on the consumption, manufacture, or sale of certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, and the like. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.

, 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911). In the instant case, the Washington State real estate excise tax is a tax on the transaction or particular privilege of selling real property. In Mahler v. Tremper , 243 P.2d 627, 629-630 (Wash. 1952), the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that a county tax on the sale of real estate is an excise tax and not a property tax because it is a tax on the transaction rather than merely ownership. Moreover, this Court has held on several occasions that so-called transaction privilege taxes concerning the transfer of property are not deductible under section 164(a)(1) because such taxes are not imposed on interests in property. See Black v. Commissioner , 60 T.C. 108 (1973) (Pennsylvania State real estate tax imposed on the transfer of property is not imposed on an interest in real property); Gibbons v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1976-125 (Maryland State real estate transfer tax on the purchase of a home is not a deductible real property tax); cf. Beimfohr v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1986-57 (a transaction privilege tax on a contractor’s gross proceeds of sales less land and labor costs is an excise tax on the privilege to engage in an occupation or business rather than a tax imposed on an interest in real property). We continue to follow these precedents.

Petitioners argue, however, that Washington State’s real estate excise tax is a form of real property tax because the State of Washington does not have a general State income tax unlike most States. The fact that Washington State does not have a general State income tax, however, is not determinative of Indeed, Washington State’s real estate excise tax is another source of the State’s tax revenues, but it is separate and distinct from Washington State’s real property tax. In fact, petitioners paid annual real estate property taxes based on their ownership interest in property. In addition, when petitioners sold their property, they paid a separate real estate excise tax based on the sale transaction. Thus, petitioners paid at least two distinguishable taxes on their property: an annual tax based on their interest in the property, and a one-time tax based on the sale of their property. State law makes this distinction and so shall we for purposes of section 164(a)(1).

Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination on this issue.

B. Section 72(t) Additional Tax

The next issue is whether petitioners are liable for the 10percent additional tax under section 72(t). Generally, a distribution from an IRA is includable in the distributee’s gross income in the year of distribution under the provisions of section 72. Secs. 61(a)(9), 408(d)(1), (3); see secs. 408(a), 4974(c)(4). Such distributions made prior to a taxpayer’s attaining the age of 59-1/2 that are includable in income generally are subject to a 10-percent early withdrawal tax unless an exception to the tax applies. Sec. 72(t)(1). As relevant herein, section 72(t)(2)(E) exempts distributions from the early withdrawal tax to the extent such distributions do not exceed a taxpayer’s qualified higher education expenses for the taxable year. See secs. 72(t)(2)(E), (7); 529(e)(3), (5). In the instant case, petitioners withdrew $30,000 from Mr. Urban’s IRA. Petitioners properly included this amount on the Form 1040 as taxable income. Although respondent initially determined that petitioners had qualified higher education expenses of $11,580, the parties stipulated that petitioners had qualified higher education expenses of $15,716, thus reducing the amount of the IRA distribution that is subject to the early withdrawal tax to $14,284. Petitioners, however, did not include on the Form 1040 the 10-percent early withdrawal tax on any portion of the IRA distribution. Thus, the issue is whether distribution is attributable to the tax consequences associated with such withdrawal) is not addressed by any of the express statutory exceptions to the early withdrawal tax. Further, there is nothing in the legislative history of section 72(t) nor in the case law to support an exception for the portion of an early distribution used to pay for the tax effect of a distribution taken for qualified higher education expenses.

The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers. Commissioner v. McCoy , 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987); Hays Corp. v. Commissioner , 40 T.C. 436, 442-443 (1963), affd. 331 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1964). Consequently, our jurisdiction to grant equitable relief is limited. Woods v. Commissioner , 92 T.C. 776, 784-787 (1989); Estate of Rosenberg v. Commissioner , 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-1018 (1980). Although we acknowledge that petitioners used the IRA distribution for laudable purposes, absent some constitutional defect we are constrained to apply the law as written, see Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner , 736 F.2d 1168, 1171-1174 (7th Cir. 1984), affg. 80 T.C. 783, 787-788 (1983), and we may not rewrite the law because we may “‘deem its effects susceptible of improvement’”, Commissioner v. Lundy , 516 U.S. 235, 252 (1996) (quoting Badaracco v. Commissioner , 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)).

Accordingly, petitioners’ appeal for relief must, in this instance, be addressed to their elected representatives. “The